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Usury Legislation-Its Effects on the Economy
and a Proposal for Reform
I. INTRODUCTION
Usury legislation historically has been the primary control im-
posed by states on the money market. The influence of such legisla-
tion on the operation of the money market has been particularly
important in the 1970's because rampant inflation and steadily ris-
ing interest rates have caused the cost of borrowing money to ap-
proach and surpass the return permitted lenders by many states'
usury laws.' At present, forty-seven states have general usury ceil-
ings.2 The degree of control placed on lenders, however, and thus the
degree of impact on the credit market, differs dramatically among
the states. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, American so-
ciety became increasingly oriented to the widespread use of credit
and debt financing. Today, leverage is often determinative of the
success of a business venture. In addition, various methods of con-
sumer credit have become routine practices and an integral part of
many individuals' budgets.3 In response to this, many states have
been forced to amend their usury statutes to permit developing
businesses and consumers to obtain financing. Many states, how-
ever, have not responded to this need or have not responded ade-
quately and the usury ceilings remain important limitations on the
availability of both business and consumer debt financing. This
Note examines both the original and current purposes of general
usury ceilings and evaluates the success of the ceilings in achieving
these purposes. In addition, the Note considers the impact of the
present form of usury legislation on the economy of those states that
have such ceilings and proposes a model usury statute that attempts
to accomplish the social policy objectives of the current legislation
while also minimizing detrimental and unintentional effects on the
economy.
1. Giles, The Effect of Usury Law On The Credit Marketplace, 95 BANKING L.J. 527,
527-28 (1978); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE CHART
BOOK 72-73 (1979). This problem has accelerated rapidly in 1979 with the attempt of the
Carter Administration to control inflation through significant increases in Federal Reserve
rates. TIME, Oct. 22, 1979, at 8.
2. NATIONAL CONSUMER FINANCE ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF STATE CONSUMER CREDIT
LAWS AND RATES (1979).
3. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES
5-21 (1972). This study documented that consumer credit outstanding rose from $21.5 billion
in 1950 to $137.2 billion at the end of 1971. Id. at 5. See also BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, HISTORICAL CHART BOOK 65-67 (1975).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
II. BACKGROUND
Most usury statutes in effect today can be traced to the Ameri-
can colonies, where legislative controls based on English precedent
were adopted soon after the settlements' formation.' The controls
were based on the historical view that certain definable evils arose
out of the relationship of borrower and lender.5 From before biblical
times, the exaction of interest for the loan of money carried grave
moral and religious connotations. The response to those views was
the creation of a curious combination of legal and theological re-
strictions. The Romans considered money lending to be a dishonor-
able practice.' This view intensified during the early Christian era
because of the Church's rigid opposition to the exaction of interest
from a borrower. 7 Usury was deemed a sin and the fear of the prac-
tice weighed heavily on members of this Church dominated society.
As the Church gained power, it imposed an absolute restriction on
the practice.8 The Church deemed interest charges sinful because it
conceived of interest not as a profit-making device but more pro-
perly as a method to reimburse the lender for his loss or expenses
in making the loan. In precommercial society, only destitute, op-
pressed persons who were forced to go into debt took out loans.
Members of society with established livelihoods found it unneces-
sary to borrow and disapproved of voluntary debt. Consequently,
charging interest for a loan was equated with taking advantage of
impoverished members of society and deemed an unacceptable
practice. These views continued in Europe throughout the Middle
Ages and well into the Renaissance. As transportation, the money
structure, and the European economy as a whole developed into a
more complex commercial system, the prohibition on interest weak-
4. Massachusetts adopted a legal maximum rate of eight percent in 1661 and Maryland
a rate of six percent in 1692. The remainder of the colonies soon followed suit. These rates
were a general legal maximum applying to all extensions of credit. S. HOMER, A HISTORY OF
INTEREST RATES 274-75 (2d ed. 1977).
5. See, e.g., R. TYLER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF USURY 35-40 (1873).
6. Frierson, Changing Concepts on Usury: Ancient Times Through the Time of John
Calvin, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 115, 118 (1969).
7. Id. at 119-20. The Old Testament provides support for this view:
He has lent on usury; he has taken interest; he shall surely not live. . . . He shall surely
suffer death; his blood is upon him.
Ezekiel 18:13.
Thou shall not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money; usury of victuals; usury
of anything. . . . Unto a stranger, thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother
thou shalt not lend upon usury.
Deuteronomy 23:19-20.
Later, religious leaders interpreted brother to connote all people. Frierson, supra note 6, at
120. See generally S. HOMER, supra note 4, at 71.
8. Frierson, supra note 6, at 119-29.
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ened but the strong moral and religious objections remained. In 1545
under Henry VIII, England became the first of the modern Euro-
pean governments to adopt a legal maximum rate of interest., This
legislation differentiated between interest and usury as a question
of degree. It shifted the focus of criticism from the taking of any
interest to the exaction of unreasonable or excessive interest. By the
seventeenth century, interest charges were considered an acceptable
function of business as long as they were controlled by legislation.
Thus, the American colonies inherited the belief that interest rates
required strict control and in the late 1600's a six percent ceiling
became the norm.'0 As settlers formed new states and wrote their
constitutions and laws, they incorporated this standard. In rural
areas, where agriculture rather than business dominated the econ-
omy, the ancient assumption that voluntary debt was sinful contin-
ued. Rural inhabitants believed that destitute and unfortunate per-
sons were driven to borrow and needed protection from oppressive
contracts with lenders who would take advantage of their necessi-
tous condition." In addition, usury legislation drew support in busi-
ness communities because it was believed that setting the price of
interest would insure the availability and affordability of credit.'
The public and the credit industry voiced little objection to statu-
tory ceilings when interest rates were low. As a practical matter,
when rates were below the statutory ceilings, the statutes had no
effect. Economic theorists, however, such as Jeremy Bentham in
"Letters in Defense of Usury"' 3 in the late 1700's, decried the ab-
sence of economic rationale for the legal restrictions. In the United
States, Richard Henry Dana, Jr. delivered a speech based on Ben-
tham's views to the Massachusetts legislature that persuaded that
body to repeal all usury legislation in the state." The drive to repeal
9. Hershman, Usury and the Tight Mortgage Market, 22 Bus. LAW. 333, 335 (1967). The
law was entitled "A Bill Against Usury" and provided for maximum interest of ten percent.
In 1713, the Statute of Anne was promulgated which lowered the ceiling rate to five per cent.
This statute served as the model for the legislation enacted in the American colonies. See
also R. TYLER, supra note 5, at 43-47.
10. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. The belief that six percent was the maxi-
mum reasonable interest rate and that any rate above that was usurious became firmly
entrenched in the social and moral views of the American public. The vitality and longevity
of this view is noted in Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint,
68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, 446-47 (1968).
11. Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA.
L. REv. 327, 329 (1967).
12. Id. at 328.
13. J. BENTHAM, Defense of Usury, in WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (1843).
14. For a discussion of the address of Richard Henry Dana, Jr. to the House of Repre-
sentatives of Massachusetts, see Shanks, supra note 11, at 330. See also F. RYAN, USURY AND
USURY LAWS 60-62 (1924).
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the statutes elsewhere, however, was short lived. In a similar speech
in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Congress to repeal the usury
statute in the District of Columbia, Benjamin J. Danielle recognized
that the lack of economic justification did not determine the out-
come of this highly controversial issue:
[Ilnnovation in that branch of our laws would not be expected without diffi-
culty. To attempt it would be to war upon one of the strongest legal prejudices
of the country. Usury statutes are a fearful testimony of that power by which
the superstition of a dark age may transmit its errors from generation to gener-
ation."
Similarly, in his 1924 analysis of usury legislation, Franklin Ryan
concluded that there was no logical economic support for a general
statutory ceiling on interest rates and that ancient prejudices con-
cerning usury prohibited the honorable and decent lender from
employing his capital for his and his borrower's advantage. 7 Despite
this almost uniform criticism of general ceilings by economists,
most states chose to create exceptions to, rather than repeal, their
usury laws.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the vast majority of
state legislatures adopted special consumer credit laws that regulate
particular types and amounts of loans and often remove them from
the coverage of the usury laws."8 The credit regulations promulgated
by the states vary greatly; critics label them a confusing maze of
overlapping regulations resulting from the piecemeal approach
taken by the legislatures in response to particular demands., The
first such consumer credit legislation considered and adopted by
numerous states was modeled on the Uniform Small Loan Law.20
15. Address by Benjamin J. Danielle to Joint Committee of the Senate and House of
Representatives on the District of Columbia, reprinted in Shanks, supra note 11, at 331.
16. F. RYAN, supra note 14.
17. Id. at XVI-XVII. Ryan states: "The business world's problem of getting rid of the
old usury laws will still persist. The impossible, unreasonable general statutory maximums
which can never have any power over the market rate of pure interest, still remain, like dead
timber in a forest, to obstruct the progress of business." Id. at XVII.
18. B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 1-4 (1965). Curran provides a
detailed analysis of the growth and form of consumer credit legislation.
19. Id. at 1-4, 131. Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
56 A.B.A.J. 946, 946 (1970). As an example, Benfield cites Illinois, which at that time had
an installment loan act, an installment loan law, a consumer finance act, a revolving loan
and credit law, an insurance premium financing law, a motor vehicle installment sales act
and an "other goods" installment sales act. He noted that each act had different maximum
rate provisions and other arbitrary differences. Id. Illinois also has a general usury ceiling
setting maximum interest at eight percent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979).
20. See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 18, at 15-45; L. ROBINSON & R. NUGENT, REGU-
LATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BusINESS (1935); Hubachek, The Development of Regulatory Small
Loan Laws, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1941).
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Originally promulgated in 1916 by the Russell Sage Foundation, a
charitable institution, the model law was seen as a social cure for
the growing problem of the loan shark business. Under the usury
laws, legitimate lenders could not feasibly make small loans to the
growing class of wage earners who could only offer income from their
jobs as security. Loan sharks acting outside the law filled this need
but utilized abusive techniques and charged exorbitant rates.' The
model statute attempted to address the problem by permitting cer-
tain approved and licensed lenders to charge higher than the legally
permitted rate. In return for this privilege the participating lenders,
usually personal finance companies, agreed to abide by state regula-
tions. The statute covered loans of up to $300, permitted an interest
rate of up to three and one half percent per month on unpaid princi-
ple,22 and contained numerous provisions designed to protect the
small borrower. 23 The model act was received very favorably. By
1941, thirty-five states had adopted it or a variation based on it.
Today Arkansas is the only state without such legislation. 2 Later,
many states adopted other legislation providing special regulation
for certain types of loans and borrowers. These special statutes es-
tablished new rate ceilings for particular loan types and exempted
the transactions from the coverage of the general usury statute. The
most common examples are statutes regulating the practices of
pawnbrokers, credit unions, and installment sales finance compa-
nies. Many states also adopted special statutes providing for bank
installment loan regulation. 25 Because of the narrow purpose and
limited scope of each statute, the control imposed frequently gives
rise to inequitable results. 2
21. Nugent, The Loan-Shark Problem, 8 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 5-6 (1941). See
generally Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 78 (1941).
22. Neifield, Institutional Organization of Consumer Credit, 8 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 23,
26 (1941). Later drafts of the uniform act lowered the permissible monthly rate to three
percent for the first $100 and two percent for the excess up to $300. B. CURRAN, supra note
18, at 22.
23. Hubachek, supra note 20, at 117-18. These provisions included: prohibitions against
deceptive advertising, against liens on real estate, against confessions of judgment or powers
of attorney, disclosure requirements for interest charges and all essential terms of the loan,
and limitations of ten percent on assignment of future wages. Id.
24. B. CURRAN, supra note 18, at 16. In Arkansas, the ten percent usury rate is in the
State constitution and the legislature is powerless to promulgate a small loan law that allows
rates higher than this ceiling. The state formerly had such a law, but the Arkansas Supreme
Court found several of its provisions unconstitutional in 1952, and the law was repealed in
1953. Id. at 26.
25. See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 18; Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges
on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REv. 81 (1967).
26. The problem is determining in each state whether a specific statute covers a partic-
ular transaction or whether it is controlled by the general usury law. Because the statutes
were promulgated to regulate particular types of transactions and lenders, there is often very
1980]
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In the late 1960's, criticism of the inconsistencies and complex-
ity of the web of state consumer credit legislation resulted in a drive
to formulate a uniform consumer credit law, analogous to the Uni-
form Commercial Code, to address the problem of consumer credit
on a comprehensive basis. The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
Code27 emphasized regulation of credit practices while allowing
competition and a reasonable rate of return to lenders.28 The basic
interest rate ceilings proposed were thirty-six percent for loans of
$300 or less, twenty-one percent for loans of $300-1,000, fifteen per-
cent for loans greater than $1,000 or an alternative comprehensive
eighteen percent overall usury ceiling.29 The Code contained exten-
sive measures regulating credit practices for borrowers' protection
as well as administrative measures to enforce the provisions." Legis-
lative reception of the Code, however, has not been overwhelming.
Only nine states have adopted it since its proposal in 1969. 3'
In 1974, Congress considered the problems caused by overly
restrictive regulation of interest rates in some states and preempted
state usury laws with regard to certain loans made by certain lend-
ers. Based on studies outlining the detrimental effects of general
maximum ceilings on interest rates for business credit in three
states that had no exceptions to their usury ceilings for business
loans,3 2 Congress passed legislation freeing certain lenders of large
business loans from low local usury ceilings.13 The law permitted
national banks and federally insured state chartered banks and sav-
ings and loan associations to charge interest on business and agri-
different and sometimes unjust treatment of different loans based on whether they fall within
a particular law. Thus, an individual who borrows $5,000 to purchase an automobile might
be subject to one interest rate regulation whereas if he borrowed the money solely as a
personal loan he might be subject to another, possibly lower rate.
27. Jordon & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387
(1968).
28. Id. at 394-95. The UCCC adopts the traditional pattern of existing legislation by
incorporating interest rate ceilings. It emphasizes, however, that they play a secondary role
in its operation. Its primary method of consumer protection is regulation of credit procedures
to prevent oppressive lending practices. At the same time, it emphasizes the protective
benefits to the consumer of competition and as a result eliminates entry barriers to potential
lenders and provides measures for disclosure to borrowers. Id.
29. Id. at 401.
30. Benfield, supra note 19, at 947. These provisions include: prohibition of confession
of judgment and waiver of defense clauses, restrictions on wage assignments and garnish-
ments, prohibitions of deficiency judgments in small credit sales, and a general authorization
to obtain injunctions against unconscionable selling, lending or collection practices. Id.
31. NATIONAL CONSUMER FINANCE ASSOCIATION, supra note 2. These states are Colorado,
Idaho, Kansas, Oklahoma, Indiana, Maine, South Carolina, Utah and Wyoming.
32. These states were Arkansas, Tennessee and Montana. S. REP. No. 93-1120, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. ConE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6249, 6259-60.
33. Act of Oct. 29, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557 (1974).
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cultural loans in the amount of $25,000 or more, regardless of any
state constitutional or statutory provision, at a rate of up to five
percent in excess of the discount rate in effect at the Federal Reserve
Bank for the district in which the institution is located.34 The law
expired in July, 1977, but similar legislation, although limited in its
application to Arkansas, was enacted in November, 1979 providing
temporary relief for that state from its constitutional interest rate
restrictions. 5 In December, 1979, Congress enacted legislation tem-
porarily preempting all states' interest rate restrictions on business
and agricultural loans greater than $25,000. In their place, Congress
substituted a federal standard permitting interest charges up to a
maximum of five percent in excess of the federal discount rate .3 1
The law applies only for a six month period ending July 1, 1980,
after which the state restrictions come back into effect. In addition,
the legislation includes provisions preempting state restrictions on
interest rates for residential loans and mortgages for a three month
period ending March 31, 1980.35.2 The legislation was passed in
response to fears about the impact on the credit market of the in-
tersection of many states' usury ceilings and the high interest rates
resulting from Federal Reserve policy. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the federal legislation is only a temporary remedy for the
problems caused by present state usury statutes. On its expiration,
the state ceilings will again be in effect.
General statutory usury ceilings are still in existence in the
majority of states and there is no indication that they will soon be
abandoned. Despite the many exceptions to their coverage, these
ceilings still constitute a significant control on the cost and availa-
bility of credit to prospective borrowers. In the 1970's the state of
the United States economy caused interest rates to approach and
surpass the rate permitted by the usury statutes of many states.
During the period that the usury ceilings were actually in force, it
became possible to judge their effectiveness in carrying out the legis-
lative purposes and to gauge their impact on the economy.
34. Id. The Act, in effect, substitutes a sliding scale standard for loans by lenders that
meet the statutory criteria in states where these loans would not be permissible under existing
usury legislation.
35. Act of Nov. 5, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-104, [1979] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
58,900. The legislation applies only in those states with constitutional provisions limiting
interest to ten percent and has an expiration date of July 1, 1981.
35.1. Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-161, [1979] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
98,080.
35.2. Id. The legislation only applies to loans secured by a first lien on residential real
property or by a first lien on stock in a residential cooperative housing corporation.
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III. STATUTORY FORMS AND EXEMPTIONS
At present, the great majority of the states have some form of
usury ceiling in effect. These statutes vary greatly among states in
their terms, scope of application, degree of regulation, provisions for
enforcement, and penalties for violation. Because of the historical
precedent discussed above,3" however, the statutes share a funda-
mental approach and methodology; all consist of a general statutory
provision limiting return to a fixed percentage of principal. Each
law addresses the usury problem by regulating loan rates rather
than the lenders' methods of making loans. Many of the statutes do
not differentiate among the many variables that determine the cost
of credit, such as loan amounts, loan purposes-business or per-
sonal, consumption or production, or administrative costs. More
importantly, the majority of statutes do not consider two key ele-
ments of every loan: first, the degree of the borrower's sophistication
or bargaining power and second, the degree of risk assumed by the
lender in making the loan. Consequently, in many cases the statutes
provide the same degree of protection for an experienced business-
man as for an uneducated welfare mother. They contemplate that
the lender will charge the same rate of interest to a borrower of a
fully collateralized loan as to a borrower who puts up no security.
Because of the large number of variations among the states on
the basic statutory ceiling, this Note will discuss only a representa-
tive sample of the statutes and the most common exceptions to their
coverage. Banking and other business interests continually have
requested the states to repeal the general statutory ceilings. Al-
though all but a few have refused to repeal the legislation, the ma-
jority of the states have created exceptions to the coverage of the
statutes and, as a result of the recent rise in interest rates, adjusted
the ceiling upward.37 In many states a general statutory ceiling appl-
icable to all loans remains in effect, but the maximum rate differs
tremendously from state to state. 8 Establishing the maximum rate
is merely a question of line drawing that requires a legislative deter-
36. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
37. Massachusetts repealed its usury law in 1868. See note 14 supra and accompanying
text. New Hampshire repealed its law in 1921. See F. RYAN, supra note 14, at 91. Several
states have recently abandoned the fixed statutory ceiling in favor of the sliding scale ap-
proach and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45010(b) (Supp.
1979) (five percentage points over the discount rate charged by Twelfth Federal Reserve
district). See notes 104-106 infra and accompanying text. New York recently raised its usury
ceiling from 8.5% to 9.5%. New York's Usury Ceiling Raised After 5 Years of Inaction, 100
SAy. & LOAN NEWS 16 (1979).
38. Compare the statutory ceiling in Pennsylvania, six percent, with the ceiling in
Rhode Island, twenty-one percent.
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mination of the point at which interest rate charges become imper-
missibly high and thus usurious. Several states set the ceiling rate
relatively high, permitting a greater margin in which freedom of
contract and the unregulated credit market can function. In other
states, the ceiling rate is set at or below the market rate. The broad-
est and most restrictive type of usury statute recognizes no excep-
tions to the regulation. The following discussion39 will demonstrate
that these laws, when effective, have the most detrimental impact
on the economy.
An interesting variation in many statutes is a special exception
for residential mortgage loans. These exceptions include provisions
excluding VA-FHA loans,40 exempting Savings and Loan Associa-
tions,4 providing special higher rates for realty mortgages,4 2 and
eliminating limitations on conventional home loans.4 3 Because home
mortgage loans are generally fully secured by real estate, the lender
assumes less risk than when making general consumer loans. Conse-
quently, there is a more constant market rate and less opportunity
for taking advantage of a naive borrower. In addition, legislatures
probably view the fact that the borrower is in a financial position
to purchase a residence as a sign that the borrower possesses a
sufficient level of sophistication and bargaining ability so that he
does not require state protection. From a practical viewpoint, be-
cause of the propensity of Americans for single family home owner-
ship, the great demand for mortgage money by consumers and the
political pressure created thereby probably had some effect on legis-
latures' decisions to promulgate these exceptions.
A second common exception, the most important in terms of
volume of loans made, provides for less restriction on business
credit. Four methods are utilized and often bombined in a single
statute: first, corporations are denied the defense of usury;"' second,
39. See notes 84-91 infra and accompanying text.
40. E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-8-6 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 682.46 (West 1946). Some state
statutes contain two or more of these exemptions.
41. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 665.395 (West Supp. 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, §
432.2 (1978). See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 18, at 60-64.
42. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(4) (Page Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 82.010(6)
(1977).
43. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-9 (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
438.31(c)(2) (Supp. 1979-80); VA. CODE § 6.1-330.37 (1979).
44. The first corporate exception statute was enacted in New York in 1850. 1850 N.Y.
Laws, Ch. 172, § 1 (now N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1978)). The amendment
to the usury ceiling was promulgated in response to a New York Court of Appeals decision,
Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850), in which a company
that had been saved from bankruptcy by a loan made at a crucial time, avoided the repay-
ment of $250,000 principal plus interest on the basis that the contract was usurious.
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different rates are applied for loans to individuals and to busi-
nesses;45 third, if the loan exceeds a certain amount there are no
restrictions on interest rates;" and, last, in some states corporations
receive a complete exemption from interest rate limitations.47 The
basis for these exceptions is both theoretical and practical. The
exceptions reflect a recognition that the usury laws are aimed at
protecting poor individual consumers rather than large corporations
that routinely rely on highly sophisticated leveraging techniques to
maximize their rate of return. These exceptions thus are an admis-
sion that the lines of protection of the all inclusive statutory ceiling
were drawn too broadly for the relevant public purpose of control-
ling usurious loan transactions. Inherent in this recognition is the
determination that large businesses, at least those that opt for the
corporate form,48 possess sufficient bargaining competence to fend
for themselves in the credit marketplace. Many legislatures chose
to draw the line of exclusion at incorporation. Presumably these
legislatures have concluded that an entity possessing adequate busi-
ness acumen or access to legal advice to opt for statutory incorpora-
tion does not need protection from its mistakes in the credit market-
place. Another consideration, the most important for purposes of
usury law reform, revealed by these exceptions is the perhaps un-
conscious acceptance by legislatures that establishing an interest
rate ceiling does not control the actual market price of credit."
45. Mississippi's usury law provides generally for a ten percent ceiling for loans, but
for loans over $250,000 to partnerships and over $2,500 to corporations there is a fifteen
percent ceiling. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1(5)(3) (Supp. 1978). Similarly, Illinois' usury law
applies a general eight percent ceiling on loans to individuals but places no limits on business
loans. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4 (1)(a), (c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). See also ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1201, 1209 (Supp. 1979-80); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 408.030, 408.035(1), (2)
(Supp. 1979).
46. Pennsylvania's usury law, for example, provides a six percent ceiling on loans to
individuals and to unincorporated businesses and no limits on loans to corporations. For loans
greater than $10,000 to unincorporated businesses and greater than $50,000 to individuals,
there is no rate limit. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201, 301(f) (Purdon Supp. 1979-80).
Nebraska exempts from its usury law loans to corporations and loans greater than $100,000
to individuals and unincorporated businesses. NEB. RE V. STAT. §§ 45-101.03, 101.04(2), (4)
(1978).
47. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:703 (West Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09
(Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE § 1701.68 (Page 1978).
48. The exemption of corporations from usury laws generally meets with approval but
is often criticized as being too narrow in its scope. See notes 101-03 infra and accompanying
text. For a consideration of the abuses of the corporation exception, see Note, Stemming
Abuses of Corporate Exceptions From the Usury Laws: A Legislative and Judicial Analysis,
59 IOWA L. REV. 91 (1973). This Note considers whether the purpose of usury laws to protect
the individual borrower is being circumvented in many states because of the ease of incorpo-
ration.
49. See notes 61-66 infra and accompanying text.
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IV. PURPOSES OF USURY LEGISLATION AND SUCCESS OF THE PRESENT
STATUTORY FORM
Before turning to the impact on the economy of an effective
usury ceiling, it is advantageous to examine more closely the pur-
poses and asserted social and economic support for the statutes. The
ancient ethical and religious views outlined above served as the
original basis for regulation of interest rates. It was believed that
public protection through regulation was necessary for the poor op-
pressed borrower who was forced by circumstances to go into debt
and to place himself at the mercy of unscrupulous lenders. Although
public attitudes toward consumer debt have changed dramatically,
many of the ancient prejudices toward lenders have survived.1"
These views, coupled with an increasing distrust of all "big busi-
ness," have made legislatures hesitant to repeal the restrictions. In
recent years, supporters of interest rate legislation have aligned
their cause with the popular trend toward consumerism. As a conse-
quence, the legislation has assumed renewed relevance and support
among consumer advocate groups. Instead of relying solely on moral
and ethical grounds, today's arguments are couched in terms of
inequalities of bargaining position between the parties resulting in
unconscionable interest rates and profits. 5' These arguments state
that in today's highly complex credit market borrowers are often
unsophisticated about credit and its costs. In their desire and need
for the loan proceeds, these borrowers will enter contracts unaware
50. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 3, at 5-6. Despite this
tremendous growth and acceptance of consumer credit-or perhaps because of it-public
opinion of lenders, in contrast to other businessmen, is often not favorable. Milton Friedman,
in a 1970 magazine article entitled "Defense of Usury," quoted the following statements on
the prejudices against lenders made by Jeremy Bentham in 1787 and reaffirmed their present
validity:
The business of a moneylender. . . has no where, nor at any time, been a popular one.
Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to future, are natural objects of
envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who have eat
their cake are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is
hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and
benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning is come, the
benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the tyrant and the
oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his own money; it is none to keep it
from him.
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1970, at 79.
The folklore of the rapacious lender who is eager to repossess or foreclose at the first indication
of default and to obtain huge profits without concern for the debtor is considered in Kripke,
supra note 10, at 448-51. The author notes that the "self-interest of business alone makes the
writer disbelieve that credit grantors of substantial size, with reputations to protect in the
financial world, walk into specific credit-granting situations knowing that where will be a
collection problem to sweat out." Id. at 449.
51. Oeltjen, Usury: Utilitarian or Useless?, 3 FLA. ST. L. REV. 167, 206-07 (1975).
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of the extent of their contractual obligations and the actual or
"effective" interest costs of the bargain. In some sectors of the popu-
lation, studies indicate a high degree of insensitivity to changes in
interest rates.5 2 Often, a more important consideration than total
interest costs for consumers with short term goals is the amount of
the monthly payment. 53 In contrast, lenders are highly knowledgea-
ble and skilled in the operation of the credit market. The proponents
of usury legislation assert that lenders are adept at designing bar-
gains that appear acceptable to the inexperienced consumer, but
whose effective cost is an unreasonable rate of return. As a result,
the parties occupy highly unequal bargaining positions. Based on
this inequality, advocates of usury legislation argue that the state
should step in and exercise its police power to protect the consumer.
Another theoretical basis in support of the present form of
usury legislation is the view that the credit market, unlike the great
majority of markets for other goods and services in this country,
does not function efficiently if regulated solely by competition. "
Supporters of this view assert that because the operation of the
credit market is imperfect, borrowers do not pay a fair price. This
imperfection stems from the inability of consumers to choose ration-
ally among credit options because of their inherent complexity. 5
Consequently, the demand for credit is highly inelastic; variations
in price do not affect the level of demand. A second asserted im-
perfection is the tendency for local credit sources to obtain and exert
monopolistic power in their particular market area. 7 In light of
these market flaws, supporters contend that only government regu-
52. E.g., Due, Consumer Knowledge of Installment Credit Charges, 20 J. MARKETING
162 (1955). See also Juster, Consumer Sensitivity to the Price of Credit, 19 J. FIN. 222 (1964).
Juster finds it necessary to qualify the traditional view represented by Due that consumers
are unresponsive to changes in the finance rates. He states: "[C]onsumers appear to be
unresponsive to finance rates because they do not have access to anything like a perfectly
competitive capital market. The closer capital markets come to this analytical ideal, the more
sensitive will consumers be to the costs of funds." Id. at 233. For the methods in the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code to bring about a more competitive capital market, see note 28 supra
and accompanying text. See also, F. Juster & R. Shay, Consumer Sensitivity to Finance
Rates: An Empirical and Analytical Investigation (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Occasional Paper 88, 1964); Mandell, Consumer Perception of Incurred Interest Rates: An
Empirical Test of the Efficacy of the Truth-in-Lending Law, 26 J. FIN. 1143 (1971) (a study
of the effects on consumer sensitivity of disclosure under the Truth-in-Lending Law); Parker
& Shay, Some Factors Affecting Awareness of Annual Percentage Rates in Consumer Install-
ment Credit Transactions, 29 J. FIN. 217 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Due, supra note 52, at 165; Shay, The Price of New Automobile Financing,
19 J. FIN. 205, 219-20 (1964).
54. E.g., Johnson, supra note 25, at 89-97; Jordan & Warren, supra note 27, at 388-92.
55. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
56. Jordan & Warren, supra note 27, at 391.
57. Johnson, supra note 25, at 95-97.
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lation will insure fair prices of credit for consumers.
One method to accomplish this regulation and the method
adopted almost universally by the states is enactment of maximum
interest rates. Supposedly this measure protects the borrower from
exploitation while insuring the availability of credit at a reasonable
rate. Implicit in the view of supporters of the present form of usury
legislation is the idea that lenders have a social duty to provide
credit at a reasonable rate to consumers. Government is charged
with enforcing this social duty through its regulation of the interest
rate."
It is not disputed that the legislative objectives for usury laws,
protecting the consumer and providing credit for public consump-
tion at a fixed reasonable rate, are valid and commendable public
purposes and proper subjects for government regulation." The issue,
however, is whether these public purposes are achieved by the pres-
ent legislation and whether the benefits produced are worth the
societal costs. It is necessary to evaluate the present system both
from an economic viewpoint to determine its efficiency in achieving
its objectives, and from a social viewpoint to determine the value
of the achievement realized. 0
58. This view was recently espoused in an editorial in a Tennessee newspaper during
the legislative hearings in that state on raising the interest rate from the constitutional ten
percent maximum:
It may not have fully dawned yet on some legislative members that they now are
the regulators of the state's lending institutions, or that they have a heavy duty to
protect the public by making sure those institutions serve the needs of those who borrow
money.
Traditionally the interest rate limit was locked into the state Constitution, saving
legislators the burden of becoming bank regulators. The 10% rate was fixed in the
Constitution on the theory that it was immoral to deprive a borrower of more than 10%
of the principal in repaying a loan. Usury-the practice of charging an unconscionable
rate of interest-is a crime. Interest rates, then, are a moral as well as legal question.
[T]he real issue the legislature is dealing with is how much interest the industry
should be allowed to charge by law.
The Senate . . . should look first at the plight of the borrowing public and weigh
just how much a borrower can afford to pay in interest rates during a period of punishing
inflation. Then senators should evaluate the profit and earning records lending institu-
tions have enjoyed.
[Tihere is no reason why Tennessee's lending institutions are entitled to a special
profit mandated by state law.
The Tennessean, Apr. 3, 1979, at 12, col. 1.
59. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), affirmed the constitutional power of the states
to regulate property that the owner devotes to a use in which the public has an interest.
60. See notes 120-24 infra and accompanying test. Ryan, in his consideration of the
problems of usury laws, emphasizes the importance of this two-tiered evaluation:
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
A. The Effect of Usury Ceilings on the Economic Function of
Interest Rates
To gauge the effectiveness of the present system of usury legis-
lation, it is necessary to examine the economic function of interest
rates in the credit market. Interest is the cost imposed on a borrower
for the present use of capital over a specified period of time. This
cost, like the cost of other goods and services, is a function of the
intersection of the demand for credit with the supply in the credit
marketplace. Unlike other goods and services, the price of which is
paid in full at the time of the exchange, the cost of credit includes
the element of uncertainty of non-repayment of both principal and
interest. This element of uncertainty is a cost that lenders must
consider in establishing the rate for a particular loan. Consequently,
the calculation of market rate includes a base charge of the cost of
"riskless" credit and additional charges sufficient to cover the risk
expense.' When the market rate for credit for a particular transac-
tion is below the usury ceiling, the statute has no effect because
market forces determine the cost of the credit."2 When the market
rate exceeds the ceiling and the transaction is not exempted, how-
ever, lenders are unable to earn the market determined return on
loans made. Consequently, these lenders have no incentive to lend
because a market analysis reveals that there is either no profit or
less than market return to be earned from the transaction. The
There exists within the bounds of the science of jurisprudence, an inarticulate evolving
body of economic thought, apart from but parallel to the systems as developed by the
economists. It is to be found in legislative acts and in court dicta and decisions. This
field of thought might be called "juristic economics." Whether society ought to establish
statutory maximums for loan charges is much more than a question in the theory of
interest. It is a problem touching not only the domain of economic theory, but also the
fields of jurisprudence and governmental science. Usury laws exist today because the
juristic theory of a usury law is sound. If this were not so, the laws would not be on the
statute books of forty-three sovereign states. The economist who says that the typical
American usury law is merely an evidence of the American legislator's ignorance of
economic principles, might well consider whether he has fully grasped the juristic theory
upon which a usury law is based.
F. RYAN, supra note 14, at XI.
61. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 3, at 139-47. Generally, the
administrative costs of lenders are relatively fixed and unrelated to the amount of credit
extended. The risk assumed by the lender and the related charge that he imposes, depend
on the terms of the loan and the characteristics of the borrower. See notes 69-71 infra and
accompanying text. See generally G. KAUFMAN, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE
ECONOMY 127-28, 151 (1973); C. PRATHER, MONEY AND BANKING 76-80 (1969).
62. J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MARKET RATES AND FLOWS 220 (1978). Proponents of an
unregulated market point to the fact that competition in the free market, not usury statutes,
has historically kept interest rates well below the statutory maximum. They also assert that
states that have exempted corporations from the usury regulations have not experienced
unreasonable interest rates for business credit.
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practical result is that less credit is available on the controlled mar-
ket . 3 Lenders with flexible portfolios will choose to invest in uncon-
trolled investments or loan in states without effective usury restric-
tions. 4 When earnings fall below the market return other lenders
whose investment opportunities are less flexible may be forced to
cut back or even cease lending. 5 To the extent that lenders invest
out of state, this credit leaves the state economy while other funds
become tied up in uncontrolled investments and are thus unavaila-
ble to borrowers. At the same time, because of the lower than mar-
ket rate, demand for credit will be artificially high and will increase
competition for the available funds. Some of these additional bor-
rowers will be consumers who would not have borrowed had the
interest rate been at market rate." Consequently, the impact of
effective usury ceilings on the supply of regulated credit available
to consumers is significant.
In addition, usury ceilings affect the distribution of the remain-
ing available credit. Interest rates, the cost of credit, perform a
rationing function similar to the cost of other goods. The rate deter-
mines the allocation of a scarce resource, credit, by establishing the
level of demand for the credit among competing consumers. 7 The
cost of credit established by these market forces presents consumers
with a choice that is exercised by bidding with dollars. Depending
on their resources and preferences, consumers may determine that
the prospective use of the principal for the loan period is not suffi-
ciently desirable to justify the costs. Similar is the decision not to
purchase or to postpone the purchase of clothes, gasoline, luxury
items or other goods and services because of their cost. 8 Conse-
quently, credit is rationed to those who exercise their choice and are
most willing to pay for it.
When the usury ceiling is in effect, however, the law interferes
with the allocation role of interest rates; the ceiling restricts the
freedom of borrowers to express their choice with dollars. As the
63. Keleher & King, Usury: The Re~ent Tennessee Experience, 6 ECON. REv. 69, 71-72
(1978); Ostas, Effects of Usury Ceilings in the Mortgage Market, 31 J. FIN. 821, 831 (1976);
Wheatley & Gordon, Regulating the Price of Consumer Credit, 35 J. MARKETING 21, 27-28
(1971).
64. Keleher & King, supra note 63, at 71-72. For an article describing the contraction
and outflow of credit in Missouri in the early 1970's because of that state's eight percent usury
ceiling, see When Usury Laws Backfire Against Borrowers, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 17, 1974, at 93.
65. Keleher & King, supra note 63, at 71-72. See generally Greer, Rate Ceilings and
Loan Turndowns, 30 J. FIN. 1376 (1975).
66. Keleher & King, supra note 63, at 71-72. See note 73 infra.
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return on loans drops below market rates, lenders will attempt to
maximize profits by adopting methods to allocate credit that will
minimize their risk and costs. Termed non-price rationing devices"
because the credit is allocated according to factors other than cost,
lenders will ration credit based on the contract terms or on borrower
characteristics.0 An example of nonprice rationing criteria based on
contract terms is the shift to requirements of larger loans, higher
loan fees, higher down payments, and shorter maturities because of
the lower costs involved in proportion to the rate of return.7' A
lender must derive all of his profit from the price he charges for the
loan. If the price is fixed, he will attempt to minimize his costs
within this profit margin. The most extensively used nonprice ra-
tioning criteria are those relating to the borrower's wealth and the
risk of nonpayment he presents. Factors such as wealth, income,
available collateral, and the relationship between the parties will
determine the risk. As a consequence of the use of these criteria, the
prospective borrowers who are first excluded from the legal credit
market and denied the ability to borrow at any price are those
borrowers who are in the market for small loans and are not compet-
itive in the nonprice rationing system. Generally this is the segment
of the population with poor credit ratings, low incomes, and high
rates of unemployment.7 2 Ironically, this class includes those unso-
phisticated borrowers that the usury laws were designed to protect.
The borrowers most assisted by the ceiling are the wealthy, low risk
borrowers who are most competitive in the nonprice rationing sys-%
tem. 73 Depending on the scope of the usury statute and the excep-
tions to its application, the supply of credit available to consumers
will contract as the discrepancy between the market rate for credit
and the legal rate increases. As this gap widens, a greater percentage
of the population will be excluded from the loan market. 74
69. Keleher & King, supra note 63, at 72-73.
70. Id. See also Robins, The Effects of State Usury Ceilings on Single Family
Homebuilding, 29 J. FIN. 227, 229 (1974).
71. Ostas, supra note 63, at 831.
72. Usury Laws Force Young Lower Income Buyers Out of the Housing Market, 100 SAv.
& LOAN NEws 28 (1979); Bowsher, supra note 67, at 18; Wheatley & Gordon, supra note 63,
at 23-24.
73. Bowsher, supra note 67, at 18. Ironically, these consumers are those most capable
of paying the market rate of interest. In addition, the artificially low cost attracts "elective"
borrowers, those with excess investment capital that elect to borrow because of the benefits
of the low rate. Their increased demand and presence in the market displaces additional
numbers of high risk, less competitive borrowers.
74. Ostas, supra note 63, at 830.
[Vol. 33:199
USURY LEGISLATION
B. Results of Studies on the Economic Impact of Usury Laws
Empirical studies of the effect of usury ceilings reinforce the
conclusions discussed above. A study of the effect of usury laws
during the tight money period of the 1960's on housing construction
revealed that the drastic slowdown in construction was concen-
trated in nine states where buyers were prohibited by usury statutes
from paying more than seven and one half percent interest.7 There
was no decline in states where there was no restriction on loan
charges. In a study of the effects of usury laws on the economies of
states in the Eighth Federal Reserve District,'7 the author found
significant evidence of a contraction of available financing. In the
first four months of 1974, the average interest rate on FHA 30-year
mortgages was 8.78% nationally; in states in the district with an
eight percent usury ceiling there was a thirty-four percent decrease
in residential construction, which contrasts with a sixteen percent
decline in the other states in the district. 7
An in-depth study of the recent Tennessee experience with
market rates exceeding the ten percent constitutional ceiling pro-
vides further evidence of the detrimental effect of the general statu-
tory ceiling.7 The study found a high degree of contraction of the
supply of funds covered by the usury ceiling as these funds were
shifted to nonrestricted investments. A significant amount of capi-
tal left the state economy and created a net decrease in credit avail-
able to state borrowers.76 The study found that finance companies
in the state had ceased making loans because they were unable to
make a profit under the ten percent ceiling after purchasing capital
at market rates and assuming risks and administrative costs. The
finance companies estimated the decline in loans outstanding at
twenty to thirty-five percent, a value of about 150 million dollars.""
Many threatened to leave the state if the legislature did not lift the
usury ceiling.81 The commercial banks included in the study were
less dependent on consumer borrowing and had a significantly
75. Cooper, A Study of Usury Laws in the United States to Consider Their Effect on
Mortgage Credit and Home Construction Starts: A Proposal for Change, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 165,
182 (1970). For an empirical analysis of the effects of usury laws on the housing industry, see
Ostas, supra note 63. Ostas found that loan to price ratios, loan maturities, and mortgage
loan volume decrease in proportion to the amount by which free market rates exceed usury
limits. Id. at 830.
76. Bowsher, supra note 67.
77. Id. at 19.
78. Keleher & King, supra note 63.
79. Id. at 72-78.
80. Id. at 75.
81. Id. at 77.
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higher proportion of low risk, large scale borrowers. For the most
part, these banks did not discontinue consumer loans as finance
companies did but utilized nonprice methods to reduce risk and
increase effective yield.2 All banks reported a tightening of credit
standards and required a de.posit relationship before considering a
prospective borrower's application.83 Lending institutions in border-
ing states reported sizable increases in loans to Tennessee residents,
but access to these lines of credit was generally limited to residents
of border areas and to borrowers of large sums.
Similar studies have been conducted on the economic impact
of the Arkansas usury ceiling when market rates rose above the ten
percent constitutional limit for a sustained period."4 In Arkansas the
usury law voids "[a]ll contracts for a greater rate of interest than
ten percent per annum. ' '. '5 The provision recognizes no significant
exceptions. Because it is a constitutional rather than a statutory
ceiling, the state legislature cannot create exceptions to its coverage
without an amendment to the constitution. The studies describe the
devastating effect the usury ceiling had on the Arkansas credit mar-
ket and the state's economy as a whole when the market rate
reached the usury ceiling. The installment loan market was effec-
tively closed down by the regulation. In 1970 Universal C.I.T., a
national consumer finance company chain, closed at least thirteen
offices in the state and discontinued making loans. " Associates Dis-
count and American Finance Company closed all their offices and
left the state. By March 1974 there were only four companies outside
of commercial banks offering installment loans in Arkansas;," the
commercial banks were forced to raise their credit standards signifi-
cantly to reduce risk. Consequently the high risk borrowers-the
poor, the elderly, and the unemployed-were denied credit. In addi-
tion, the study emphasized the oppressive effect of the usury law on
82. Id. at 75-77.
83. Id. at 77.
84. Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent Simple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 U. ILL.
L.F. 592; Mitchell, Usury in Arkansas, 26 ARK. L. REv. 263 (1972); Study, An Empirical Study
of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That. . .," 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 544; B. Lam-
bert, The Arkansas Usury Law-A Hindrance to Progress When Interest Rates Are High
(March 1974) (unpublished study) (copy on file with Vanderbilt Law Review).
85. ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13. Because of the all-inclusiveness of the Arkansas law, it
provides an opportunity to analyze the effects of a "pure" usury ceiling, one whose control of
interest rates is not diminished by special credit legislation. See note 24 supra. If the statute
and the economic and social philosophy behind it is not successful in Arkansas, it provides
strong evidence that similar, if less restrictive, statutes in other states are not fulfilling their
intended function.
86. B. Lambert, supra note 84, at 43-47.
87. Id. at 47.
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the state's border cities, which were forced to compete with rela-
tively unregulated jurisdictions.8 The most damaging result of the
ten percent ceiling was the contraction of business credit and the
virtual elimination of risk and venture capital from the state. The
large national insurance and mortgage companies that normally
provide much of the risk capital throughout the nation systemati-
cally removed Arkansas from consideration as an investing mar-
ket.8 The U.S. Congress recognized these detrimental effects on
business and agricultural credit in this state and others in 1974 and
again in 1979 and remedied them to some extent with legislation
that preempted the restrictions on large business and agricultural
loans made by most banks in the state."0 James Mitchell, in a 1972
article," summarized the effect of the ten percent interest ceiling
during periods of high interest rates:
1. It drives risk capital from the market and risk takers-particularly ambi-
tious young native sons-from the state.
2. It drives the price of legitimate money up since many borrowers must
travel out of state to get money or must bring test cases to see if they have
successfully evaded the law.
3. It raises the cost of many retail credit items since retailers must make up
out of cash profits what they would otherwise get out of interest paid by credit
buyers.
4. It eliminates jobs from the economy since many consumer loan companies
and more retailers have simply refused to locate in the state ....
5. It helps depress development of Arkansas border cities-Texarkana being
the prime example ....
6. It raises credit standards, thereby denying to the poor the ability to buy
and enjoy household appliances and other such common items which form the
core of the credit market in most states.2
Investigations in other states have resulted in similar findings. 3
As the studies reveal, the protection afforded the consumer by usury
statutes is of questionable value. For potential middle income and
88. Id. at 15-19. Lambert found that the usury ceiling had slowed significantly the
development of Texarkana, Arkansas, and Fort Smith because of this competition. His study
revealed that in 1970 Texarkana, Arkansas, which consisted of one-third of the Texarkana
metropolitan area, had only four new and used car dealerships while Texarkana, Texas had
forty. A similar disparity was found in the number of furniture and appliance dealers present
in different sectors of the city. Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 48-53.
90. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text. See also Stephens Security Bank v.
Eppivic Corp., 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976).
91. Mitchell, supra note 84.
92. Id. at 316-17.
93. See Bowsher, supra note 67; Giles, supra note 1; King, Usury Ceilings: Shield or
Scourge?, 64 EcoN. REV. 111 (1979) (analysis of nine recent studies of the effects of usury
ceilings on mortgage credit in the United States); Wheatley & Gordon, supra note 63, at 23-
28; Touche, Ross & Co., A Study of the Mortgage Loan Interest Rate Ceiling in Texas (Nov.
1978) (unpublished study for Texas Savings and Loan League).
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wealthy borrowers, the laws may make it significantly more difficult
to obtain credit. For poor and high risk borrowers, the laws may
effectively foreclose the opportunity to obtain funds from a legal
source at any price.
C. The Loan Shark Problem
Another important social impact of effective usury ceilings is
their support of the illegal loan market. Studies have found the
problem of loan sharking and its concomitant consumer abuses to
be directly related to the degree of restraint of interest rate controls
in a particular jurisdiction. 4 The loan shark problem prompted leg-
islatures across the country in the early twentieth century to adopt
uniform small loan legislation that permitted legitimate lenders to
charge higher than ceiling rates on small loans. 5 The practical re-
sult of the exclusion of poor and high risk borrowers from the legal
market by effective usury ceilings is to force some of these borrowers
to seek credit in the illegal market. Recent studies reveal that, at
least in many areas, this illegal loan market is operated by the
syndicate on a highly organized and sophisticated scale. These stud-
ies also reveal an alarming growth in size of the problem in the past
several decades and cite estimates from the late 1960's of loan vol-
umes ranging from $350 million to over $1 billion."9 In this market,
there is a significant lack of competition and no government regula-
tion of loan practices. The result is often outrageous interest charges
and abusive lending practices." Other harmful effects of the pres-
ence of organized crime in a traditionally legitimate industry in-
clude financial support of the syndicate's other activities and the
general expansion of its power and control." Unfortunately, usury
ceilings when in effect foster the growth of loan sharking by contrib-
uting to the pool of potential borrowers from this market. Again
ironically, the class most likely to resort to the illegal market in-
cludes the poor and uneducated borrowers that present usury legis-
lation attempts to protect."
94. Jordan & Warren, supra note 27, at 389-90; Neifield, supra note 22, at 24-25;
Oeltjen, supra note 51, at 214-15.
95. B. CURRAN, supra note 18, at 16; Jordan & Warren, supra note 27, at 389-90.
96. Note, Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PRoB. 91, 92 (1969).
97. Id. at 95-96. One survey reported interest rates ranging up to 2,000 percent and
averaging 250 percent annually. Comment, Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New York's
Usury Statute, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 167 (1966).
98. Note, supra note 96, at 98-101.
99. Id. at 96-97, 100.
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V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. The Corporate Exception
As interest rates rose during the 1970's to the maximum legal
level in many states and as the unfavorable effects described above
became evident, many states began to consider methods to reform
the general usury ceiling. The simplest reform to implement would
be expansion of the corporate exception within the framework of the
present usury laws.' Enactment of these exceptions across the
country would free business credit from the restrictions of usury
ceilings and would remove some of the legislation's purposeless con-
trol and restraint of businesses. This reform, however, would be a
partial reform at best. Although the corporate legal form is some
indicia of business sophistication, it is not an accurate definition of
those who are adequately sophisticated as not to require government
protection. Other business entities such as single proprietorships
and partnerships are often equally sophisticated in business af-
fairs. 10' Individuals also are discriminated against by this classifica-
tion. The exception does not attempt to differentiate between those
individuals that are sufficiently knowledgeable to fend for them-
selves in the credit marketplace and those that are not. The protec-
tion of all consumers as a class is too broad, with the result that too
many individuals are prevented from entering contracts, the risks
and costs of which they are fully aware. Another problem is the lack
of uniformity among the states as to the treatment of corporations
formed ostensibly for the purpose of avoiding the usury restric-
tions. '2 Finally, the corporate exception sometimes may encourage
100. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
101. Many states have recognized this failure to distinguish accurately the entities that
are competent to bargain in the credit market without state protection. Thus, the usury law
in Illinois provides no limits for both corporations and unincorporated businesses with loans
greater than $5,000. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(1)(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). See also NEB.
REV. STAT. § 45.101.04 (1978) (no interest rate limits for corporations and no limits for loans
to partnerships); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-09 (Supp. 1979) (no interest rate limits for corpora-
tions or for businesses with loans greater than $35,000); VA. CODE §§ 6.1-330.43-.44 (1979) (no
interest rate limits for corporations and for unincorporated businesses with loans greater than
$5,000). The U.S. Congress, in recent legislation preempting state usury restrictions on large
business loans made by national and federally insured state banks, recognized the distinction
and opted to exempt all business loans and not merely those made to corporate entities. S.
REP. No. 93-1120, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6249, 6261.
102. See Shanks, supra note 11, at 344-500. The problem is the judicial treatment of
corporations formed for the sole purpose of falling within the exception to the usury laws. The
courts have taken two different approaches. One approach is to determine only if the entity
is a valid corporation under the laws of the state; if so, the corporation is exempt from the
usury laws regardless of the purposes for incorporation. See, e.g., Werger v. Haines Corp.,
302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951). The second approach considers the purpose for incorpo-
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an inefficient and unwise preference among potential borrowers for
the corporate form over other legal frameworks.1 3
B. The Sliding Scale
Another proposal that several states have enacted'04 is termed
the "sliding scale. 101 5 Under this system, the fixed statutory ceiling
is replaced with a flexible "sliding" maximum that is keyed to a
federal index of interest rates. Usually the index is the Federal
Reserve Discount Rate; the statutory rate is set at some margin,
such as five percentage points,' 6 above this rate. As the index rate
changes, the usury ceiling rises or falls correspondingly. Allowing
the permissible interest rate to fluctuate based on changes in the
economy and in cost of credit to lenders has several distinct advan-
tages. Because the index to which the usury rate is keyed reflects
the market price of credit, the ceiling is a realistic reflection of the
market determined rate. The sliding scale provides considerably
less restriction on both business and individual credit availability
and allows competition to set the rate within the confines of the
statutory margin. Lenders are able to obtain a suitable profit mar-
gin. Greater numbers of borrowers are able to obtain credit and still
be protected from unreasonable interest rates. Under this system, a
greater percentage of borrowers-those who present the normal risk
of nonpayment-are accommodated because in most proposals the
margin above the index is set to provide a reasonable return on loans
to these types of borrowers. In addition, the flexible scale avoids the
problem of credit interruption caused by legislative delays that
occur when the market rate rises to the level of the fixed ceiling rate.
This proposal seems to be the one most acceptable to both the credit
ration and whether the loan is actually for the corporation or for an individual who owns it.
If the latter, the court may pierce the corporate veil and consider the transaction within the
scope of the usury law. See, e.g., Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654
(1952). See generally Note, Stemming Abuses of Corporate Exemptions From the Usury
Laws: A Legislative and Judicial Analysis, 59 IowA L. REv. 91 (1973).
103. This problem arises when the decision whether to incorporate is influenced by the
availability of credit to corporations in jurisdictions with restrictive usury laws. Incorporation
is not the most efficient legal framework for many types of businesses. See R. HAMILTON,
CORPORATIONS-INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTHERSHIPS 7-11 (1976). In addition,
from a public policy standpoint incorporation limits the liability of ownership for torts and
other acts that subject the business to potential liability. It may not be advantageous for state
laws to create an additional factor weighing in favor of this form.
104. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b) (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301
(Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-14-102-103 (Supp. 1979).
105. See Cooper, supra note 75, at 185-89; Merriman & Hanks, Revising State Usury
Statutes in Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REV. 13, 15 (1967).
106. There is some disagreement as to what is the appropriate index for the sliding
system. See Giles, supra note 1, at 544-47.
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industry and consumer advocate groups.
Unfortunately, the sliding scale also represents only a partial
solution. Despite its tremendous improvement over the fixed rate,
it still shares many of the problems inherent in a fixed maximum
ceiling. This proposal provides access to credit for a greater percen-
tage of borrowers who present the normal risk, but depending on the
size of the margin above the index, it still eliminates certain classes
of borrowers from the credit market. It excludes high risk borrowers
when the costs of administration and risk exceed the legal return. 101
For the same reason, the sliding scale could also restrict the avail-
ability of high risk venture and development capital in the state.08
Thus, despite the advantage of flexibility, the sliding scale has the
same fundamental flaw as the fixed rate; it fails to consider risk as
a factor in the cost of credit.
C. The Unconscionability Standard
Another proposal' 9 advocates the wholesale repeal of the pres-
ent fixed rate usury laws and the substitution of a flexible uncon-
scionability standard. This standard would permit judicial review
of loan agreements to determine if overreaching or unjust bargaining
methods forced the borrower into an unconscionable bargain. Under
the proposal, the parties would have complete freedom of contract
to agree to any interest rate, but the "courts may declare any loan
transaction usurious where the interest rate is excessive and the
loan, taken as a whole, is harsh and unconscionable.""10 The result
is an unregulated market subject only to the requirement of good
faith and fair dealing, similar to the standard for sales contracts
under the Uniform Commercial Code."' The proposal also suggests
that there be a presumption of fair dealing, especially in commercial
loans, when equal bargaining power is likely. In the absence of evi-
dence of bargaining inequality or overreaching, the court would not
interfere with the contract. In the event of evidence of overreaching
or substantial bargaining inequality, the courts would examine the
loan even if the interest rate is not extraordinarily high."2
This proposal has significant merit and provides an appealing
107. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 62-74 supra and accompanying text.
109. Note, An Ounce of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for Usury
Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 105 (1955).
110. Id. at 108.
111. U.C.C. § 2-302. For a criticism of the origin and value of this provision, see Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
112. Note, supra note 109, at 109.
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compromise between freedom of contract, an unrestricted credit
marketplace, and provisions for consumer protection. It would elim-
inate the detrimental effects on the economy and the exclusion of
borrowers from the credit market that occurs under present legisla-
tion.
Several potential problems, however, are present in the scheme.
One is the costs of administration that might arise under the stan-
dard. Each review of an agreement would require evidence, opinions
as to reasonableness and market rate, and a hearing. This would be
a significant addition to the caseload of already burdened judicial
and administrative systems. A second problem is the uncertainty
inherent in the unconscionability standard.' 3 The standard pro-
vides no clear guidelines for predicting when a loan will be deemed
unconscionable. Although this problem will not arise in the majority
of loans, those made to credit-worthy borrowers at normal market
rates, it might arise in cases of high risk loans in which the lender
is forced to charge a high rate of interest in order to cover his costs
and the risks assumed. Consequently, the standard promulgated by
the legislature should include the determination of when an interest
rate is unconscionable: whether an unconscionable interest rate ex-
ists only in instances in which overreaching is present and the bor-
rower is forced to pay higher than the market rate, or if the market
113. The problems raised by judicial determination of the unconscionability standard
are evident in the court's construction of the standard for sales contracts under U.C.C. § 2-
302. This section states in part: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract. . . to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the
contract . . . ... Id. The official comment defines the test for unconscionability as "whether,
in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular
trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circum-
stances existing at the time of the making of the contract." The comment further states that
it is a question of the "prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and not of disturb-
ance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302, Official
Comment 1. In several cases, however, courts have emphasized the inequality of the bargain-
ing power rather than oppression and unfair surprise. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
considered contracts for the sale of household goods and appliances and held that the trial
court should reconsider the terms of the contracts to determine if they were unconscionable.
The dissenting judge, however, recognized the delicate social issues involved, and stated that
the role of the state in consumer protection was one for the legislature to define. As back-
ground to this case, it is advantageous to consider a study made of installment sales and
credit practices for the sale of household furnishings and appliances in the District of Colum-
bia. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMic REPORT ON-INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES
PRACTICES OF DisTRiCT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968). The study revealed that low income
market retailers received an average percentage gross margin on most appliances that was
twice that of general market retailers. The net profits after expenses such as insurance and
shoplifting and bad debt losses, however, were about the same for ghetto furniture retailers
as for the retailers operating in the general market. See also Leff, supra note 111, at 551-58.
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rate itself is at some point unconscionable."' The proposal indicates
that the former is appropriate, but under the present ceilings it
appears that the legislature, by deeming the market rate for loans
illegal, has concluded that those rates are unconscionable. This de-
termination is more appropriate for legislative than judicial consid-
eration because of the fundamental social policy questions pre-
sented.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
A. Advantages of a Free Market
In depth consideration of the problems created by usury laws
leads to the conclusion that an unregulated credit market is sub-
stantially more beneficial to the public than the present system.
The only purpose of usury ceilings that finds support in public pol-
icy is the protection of unsophisticated borrowers. There is no logi-
cal basis in economic theory for the regulations as a method to
provide plentiful, inexpensive credit for the public. 115 In addition, as
the evidence reveals, the argument that present laws protect unso-
phisticated consumers presupposes that it is better for them to get
no loan than a loan at the interest rates set in a free market. One
author has described the benefits of the unregulated system in this
manner:
(1) the very costly process of regulation, which surely feeds the fires of inflation
and fuels bureaucratic waste, could be eliminated; (2) the whole area could
rapidly become less complex as the need to devise schemes to increase reve-
nues by skirting usury laws evaporates; (3) through competition, debtors
would be charged only what their risk class dictates; (4) merchants of debt
would be limited to a marginal rate of return; and (5) credit would be made
available to a wide spectrum of potential borrowers."'
Admittedly, there would be some abuse by unscrupulous lenders in
an unregulated market, but there are methods to regulate the prac-
tices of lenders themselves without regulating the market rate and
without unduly interfering with the affairs of honest businessmen
and the operation of the credit market."17 The states could imple-
ment a streamlined unconscionability standard, with "unconscion-
able" defined as a rate of interest above the market rate procured
through overreaching. The effect of this standard would be to give
114. See notes 126-31 infra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text; Avio, On the Effects of Statutory
Interest Rate Ceilings, 29 J. FIN. 1383 (1974); Greer, Rate Ceilings, Market Structure, and
the Supply of Finance Company Personal Loans, 29 J. FIN. 1363 (1974).
116. Oeltjen, supra note 51, at 223.




borrowers protection from those lenders that do not act in good
faith. The borrower would have the opportunity to prove over-
reaching and the lender would have the opportunity to show that
the rate was in fact reasonable. The standard would operate to raise
automatically the bargaining position of naive borrowers. Lenders
making loans to these borrowers would consider at the time of mak-
ing the loans whether a court would find the rate of return reason-
able in light of the costs and risks present. The standard would exert
constant pressure on lenders to maintain defensible bargaining
practices, but at the same time would cause little hindrance or
interruption for the majority of lenders who routinely employ ethical
bargaining methods. States could also issue guidelines for proper
lending practices that would help lenders determine what consti-
tutes overreaching. In addition, states could attempt to improve
competition among lenders so that consumers would have the maxi-
mum number of sources of credit at the least expensive rates avail-
able."' Finally, uniform disclosure legislation, similar to the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act, could be enacted to increase the information
available to the consumer. Other means of counseling and educating
borrowers could be implemented to increase their ability to compre-
hend available information."'
In light of the illegal and totally unregulated market that pro-
vides the only option for many borrowers who are excluded from
access to legal credit under present legislation,' an unrestricted
legal market might constitute the most efficient method of social
protection for the majority of borrowers. In an unregulated market,
the great majority of borrowers would have access to credit from
lenders whose practices are subject to public review.' The result
might be that a smaller percentage of borrowers would fall prey to
unscrupulous lenders whose unethical practices were not detected
by public scrutiny. In addition, all prospective borrowers under this
system would have freedom of choice, which although not easily
valued in dollars, is of tremendous significance in terms of maximiz-
118. Despite the traditional assumption that the credit market requires regulation be-
cause competition does not work adequately, see Jordan & Warren, supra note 27, at 389,
391, and Oeltjen, supra note 51, at 209-12, the great majority of studies that have considered
the problem in detail suggest that the credit market can operate relatively efficiently with
competition. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code adopts this view and provides for minimal
entry barriers for potential lenders in order to maximize competition. Jordan & Warren, supra
note 27, at 394-95. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 3, at 136-
39.
119. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANcE, supra note 3, at 193-200.
120. See notes 94-99 supra and accompanying text.
121. Many authorities view competition by legal lenders as the determinative factor in
controlling the loan shark problem. Oeltjen, supra note 51, at 220-21.
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ing human satisfaction.' 22 In choosing this system, the legislature
would be opting for the lesser of two social costs: the cost of allowing
unscrupulous lenders to take advantage of a percentage of borrowers
in exchange for the benefit of permitting the vast majority of bor-
rowers the benefit of freedom of choice and freedom from the restric-
tions of over-protective legislation. In weighing the social costs and
benefits of the unregulated system, there is strong support for this
choice because of the doubts about the societal benefits of the pres-
ent system. In the United States, as a rule, government resorts to
price fixing only in emergency situations or under other special cir-
cumstances; prices in the great majority of markets for goods and
services in the nation are not regulated.'2 As a result, many econo-
mists question government's election to protect the naive consumer
in the credit market when he is free to enter unreasonable contracts
for the purchase of commodities in other, unregulated markets. 24
Under this analysis, there is no basis for imposing the considerable
restriction of present legislation on the credit market and on compe-
tent, sophisticated borrowers that do not need state protection and
are injured by it.
In addition, there is a fundamental theoretical problem at issue
that should be considered by the legislature before it decides to
reject the unconscionability standard for a more restrictive usury
law. Any regulation of credit costs other than the protection of bor-
rowers from unfair dealing by lenders will exclude some high risk
borrowers from the credit market. 125 The legislature cannot expect
lenders to lend to consumers at the ceiling rate if an investment with
greater return or a less risky investment with equal return is avail-
able. The provision of goods or services at or below market rates
amounts to a subsidy. It is unlikely that lenders voluntarily will
assume the social welfare role of providing credit for these borrowers
at below market rates. Present legislation intends for lenders to
assume this role, but the economic results reveal that it has not been
successful and will not be until additional incentives to lend are
122. As James Cooper pointed out in his review of the effect of usury laws on the
availability of mortgage credit, "We should not underestimate the immeasurable effects on
family life of the postponed fulfillment of a life goal such as a home of one's own." Cooper,
supra note 75, at 169. Because residential mortgages are among those types of loans that usury
laws most restrict, this problem is highly significant. Statistics reveal that the impact of
rationed mortgage credit under effective usury ceilings falls most heavily on middle and lower
income young families attempting to purchase their first homes. Usury Laws Force Young,
Lower Income Buyers Out of Housing Market, supra note 72, at 28.
123. Jordan & Warren, supra note 27, at 388-89.
124. Bowsher, supra note 67, at 17. See note 118 supra. But see notes 52-57 supra and
accompanying text.
125. See notes 69-73, supra and accompanying text.
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provided.' 6 Under present legislation, consumers are protected from
all interest rates above the statutory ceiling that are deemed usu-
rious per se, although in many cases the rate may be a reasonable
market rate. The legislature should carefully consider the impact on
high risk borrowers of a social policy decision to "protect" these
consumers from "unfair" interest rates.
Consequently, a key issue for legislative consideration is
whether the market rate for a loan should ever be deemed usurious.
Franklin Ryan, in his analysis of usury laws,"27 addresses this di-
lemma and delineates two instructive definitions of usury. 'Legal
usury" he defines as taking more than the law permits as a charge
for the use of money. '28 Under this definition, it is irrelevant whether
the lender deserves the additional return because of his costs,
whether the borrower is in a financial position to and is desirous of
paying the charge to obtain the principal and whether the addi-
tional return is reasonable in light of the costs and risks of the
loan. '29 Ryan defines the second type of usury, "moral usury," as the
"taking advantage of the ignorance or necessitous condition of the
needy borrower so as to get him into a hard bargain and to extract
from him unduly high charges."' 3 Ryan claims that it is this second
type of practice that legislatures attempted to eradicate through
regulation. The method they chose to prevent moral usury was legal
usury, by establishing a rate that they deemed the maximum rea-
sonable return for granting credit. Inherent in Ryan's analysis is the
view that the market rate is never really morally usurious, 3' that the
lender is not "taking advantage of. . .the needy borrower" when
the borrower has the option of transacting in an open market with
other lenders who would charge virtually the same rate.
The opposing view is that at some point society deems the rate
of interest, even if justified as reasonable from a market analysis,
to be too great. The legislature should devise price fixing structures
to prevent the exaction of these rates. The lender, however, will not
lend at the fixed rate-that rate deemed "fair" by the legislature-if
it is below market. Consequently, the legislature must recognize
that such a price fixing scheme represents a conscious decision to
exclude a class of borrowers from the legal market in order to protect
them from their own mistakes.
126. For a discussion of the alternative methods and costs of providing this subsidy to
high risk borrowers, see note 140 infra.
127. F. RYAN, supra note 14.
128. Id. at XII.
129. Id. at 77.
130. Id. at XII.
131. Id. at 77.
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B. Proposal ... A Modified Free Market
As a practical matter, the determinative factor in the proposal
outlined above is the likelihood of persuading state legislatures that
the proper role of the state would be to regulate only moral
usury-unfair bargaining practices-and not the cost of credit itself.
In light of the historical bias in favor of interest rate legislation,'
32
the intense emotional, moral, and social disagreement over it, 33 and
the traditional hesitancy of government to retrench in regulation of
an area that it has previously occupied, such deregulation appears
highly unlikely. Consequently, it is advantageous to consider an
alternative proposal. The objective of this proposal is two-fold: to
protect the unsophisticated borrower from unscrupulous lenders,
unfair credit practices, and from an "unfair" rate and to minimize
the burdensome effect of the regulation on the economy.
In order to replace the general statutory ceiling with a more
efficient scheme, it is necessary to devise a system that, first, con-
siders and makes allowances for the different levels of bargaining
competence of borrowers, and, second, considers the importance of
risk in determining the price of credit. To minimize the burdensome
restraint on the ability of the public to borrow, the legislature must
establish a standard that differentiates among levels of bargaining
competence and indicates the point at which the prospective bor-
rower has reached a bargaining position of sufficient sophistication
to compete in an unregulated market. If the borrower meets this
minimum level of bargaining competence, the state should not con-
trol the rate of interest that he can agree to pay. Any control over
such a borrower, even a "margin of safety" system such as the
sliding scale approach, runs the risk of restricting venture capital
and other loans that present higher than normal risk. 34 For the
legislation to be most efficient and cause the least interruption of
the credit market, it should affect only the class of borrowers that
does not meet this minimum level. The standard should be simple
to apply so that lenders will have clear guidance in differentiating
among borrowers. The corporate exception, although deficient be-
cause of its limited application, is an example of a standard that
distinguishes among borrowers' levels of bargaining power and is
simple to apply.135 A more suitable standard is one that accurately
and specifically defines the class of borrowers that is most often
subject to the abuses because of needy circumstances and lack of
132. See notes 5-15 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 58 supra.
134. Bowsher, supra note 67, at 18-19.
135. See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
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sophistication and bargaining ability. This class consists of individ-
uals that are in the market for loans for personal consumption and
for small amounts. Consequently, the legislation should only apply
to borrowers taking out consumer loans, in contrast to commercial
or investment loans, 3 ' for a small amount such as less than$10,000.13 Borrowers who meet these minimum requirements-
those that seek non-consumer loans or loans larger than $10,000-
would be presumed to have some basic degree of bargaining com-
petence and business knowledge and would not be subject to the
law's protection.
The next problem is to assure that a significant supply of con-
sumer credit will be made available to high risk borrowers in the
class protected by the legislation, while retaining reasonable limits
on the rates charged those borrowers. A sliding scale system with a
substantial margin, such as ten interest points,'38 above the Federal
136. Business and investment loans should not be covered by usury legislation even if
they meet the second classification of small amount. To subject loans for these purposes to
rate ceilings would give rise to interference with business and investment credit. As in the
case of borrowers who fall within the corporate exception, there is no need to protect borrowers
of these types of loans because they possess the requisite degree of business sophistication
and the knowledge to choose among credit options. A disclosure of purpose requirement could
be implemented in loan transactions with the burden of proof on lenders to show reasonable
inquiry and good faith belief that the purpose was as represented in cases of non-consumer
loans exempted from the legislation.
137. This legislative classification based on loan amount causes the regulation to apply
to the vast majority of needy and unsophisticated borrowers who are most likely to be victim-
ized by unscrupulous lenders without creating the tremendous burden on the rest of the
borrowing public imposed by present legislation. The standard insures that few borrowers
that fall within the class requiring protection would not be covered by the law. Few borrowers
in this class are in the market for loans of an amount greater than $10,000; even if they make
application for a loan of this size, it is doubtful that they could obtain the loan because of
the high risk of nonpayment. Consequently, these poor, high risk borrowers are in effect
protected by the market. Many states, in their present usury legislation, recognize the correla-
tion between loan amount and borrower sophistication. Thus, in states such as Ohio, Ken-
tucky, Alaska, Hawaii, and Delaware, present legislation provides an exemption from the rate
ceilings when loan amounts reach a certain size. Again, however, in most states the lines of
the classification are drawn too broadly for the purpose to be achieved. Thus, in Alaska and
Ohio, the exemption only applies to loans greater than $100,000. ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.010(b)
(Supp. 1979); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1343.01(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1978). In Hawaii the loan
must be greater than $750,000. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 478-8 (1976). Kentucky law provides a
much lower exemption point of $15,000. Ky. REv. STAT. § 360.010 (Supp. 1978).
Determining the loan amount that is to make the legislation operative is essentially a
question that should be addressed after careful consideration by the legislature of credit
circumstances in a particular state. Empirical studies, considering education, income, and
borrowing habits, could be done to determine the minimum loan amount for which state
protection would not be necessary. A higher or lower minimum amount might be a more
appropriate dividing line for a particular jurisdiction. The amount chosen should be keyed
to a flexible federal index to prevent the figure from becoming unrealistic through inflation
of the currency.
138. Again, establishing this margin in which the parties can agree to an interest rate
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Reserve Discount Rate would best achieve this objective. The legis-
lature would deem any interest rate above this maximum too great
to allow a borrower of this "consumer" class to pay regardless of the
risks he presents. This system would provide all of the advantages
of the sliding scale described above,'39 but in addition, the ten point
margin would allow a more substantial range above the federal
index in which lenders could tailor interest charges to the adminis-
trative costs and risks of each loan. As a result, legitimate sources
of credit would be available not only for borrowers who present
normal risk but for those in the high risk category. The higher mar-
ket rate of return permitted would provide the necessary incentive
for lenders to offer credit to a greater percentage of high risk borrow-
ers. At the same time, the system would place reasonable limits on
rates for the protection of these borrowers.' Finally, the system as
is a question of legislative line drawing. The legislature should resist the temptation to set
the maximum at what it deems a "reasonable rate of interest" for the majority of borrowers.
By providing an extra margin over the interest rate that borrowers of average risk will be
required to pay, the legislature provides the incentive for lenders to accommodate a greater
number of high risk borrowers.
139. See notes 101-05 supra and accompanying text.
140. As a consequence of placing these limits of reasonableness on loan rates, however,
some borrowers that would have access to sources of credit in an unregulated market will be
excluded from legal credit sources by their failure to meet the requirements of the credit
industry even within these expanded interest rate limits. The legislatures might consider the
possibility of social welfare programs structured to enable these borrowers to obtain credit
within the reasonable rate limitations. Such social welfare programs must either compel
lenders to lend to these borrowers by law or create additional incentives to compensate for
the lower than market return. One method would be to create a pool of high risk borrowers
that cannot obtain credit independently at the usury ceiling rate. The state could devise a
method similar to high risk automobile insurance pools often found in states with no fault
insurance programs to assign a pro rata number of these borrowers to each lender, perhaps
based on the volume of business that lender did in the state. The state could require by law
that lenders make credit available to these borrowers at the maximum legal rate. The legisla-
ture could promulgate standards to differentiate borrowers of mere high risk from those that
present little or no likelihood of repayment in order to control the bad debt costs imposed on
the lender. This method of providing credit to these borrowers may be highly appealing to
some sectors of society, because initially it appears that lenders would absorb the costs of
this subsidy. See note 58 supra. Closer consideration, however, reveals that the proposal
would operate in a highly inequitable manner (without deciding whether imposing this wel-
fare cost on lenders would be equitable). Lenders would not absorb the costs of providing
credit to high risk borrowers at below market rates, but would pass them through to other
borrowers by raising the cost of credit for them. The result would be that the subsidy would
be borne not by the enterprise or by society as a whole but by other consumers who utilized
the state's credit institutions. Certainly this is not a highly equitable allocation of the welfare
cost.
A more just apportionment of this welfare cost would be for all members of society to
bear a proportionate share. This is usually done by funding a subsidy from general tax
revenues. One method would be for states to guarantee high risk loans in order to bring the
interest rate within legal levels. A similar program of guaranteeing student loans has been
implemented on the federal level. The advantages of such a program would be access for all
1980]
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a whole would provide clear-cut guidelines for lenders to follow in
determining whether the legislation applied to particular loan trans-
actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The general statutory ceiling form of usury legislation found in
the majority of states should be repealed or reformed. The applica-
tion of a single numerical ceiling to all loan charges for all types of
loans and borrowers is an archaic and unrealistic approach to regu-
lation of today's complex credit industry. The legislation, in its
present form, injures the class of borrowers it was designed to pro-
tect by excluding them from the credit market and in some cases
forcing them to resort to illegal sources of credit. Even if the legisla-
ture deems this exclusion proper-in effect decides that a class of
borrowers should be prohibited from borrowing when rates reach a
certain point-the present legislation with its low fixed ceiling and
all-inclusive application is too broad. It indiscriminately relegates
borrowers to this excluded class, without any basis for the legislative
classification in lack of bargaining power or inability to pay higher
interest. The legislation provides no other advantages to the borrow-
ing public with the possible exception of allowing wealthy borrowers
to obtain credit at lower than market rates. In addition, when effec-
borrowers to legitimate credit sources, reasonable rates for all borrowers, and increased com-
petition between legal and illegal credit suppliers. The disadvantages, of course, would in-
clude significant cost to the state, but it is unavoidable if this subsidy is to be provided. See
J. VAN HORNE, supra note 62, at 223-26.
A third alternative would be the formation of a credit union, underwritten by the govern-
ment, to serve as a lender of last resort for this class of high risk borrowers. A similar program
has been implemented by the Small Business Administration to provide credit at reasonable
rates for high risk businesses. This proposal would provide all the advantages of the guarantee
system. Disadvantages would include the costs of formation and operation of an ongoing
government bureaucracy.
A fourth and appealing method to allocate this subsidy cost would be to provide tax
incentives, either at the federal or state level, to lenders to provide high risk credit. The
characteristics of the class of high risk borrowers to be subsidized could be specified in tax
legislation. For lenders providing credit to these borrowers, a decrease in tax liability would
be permitted in proportion to the amount of high risk credit loaned. This system would
impose the costs of the welfare subsidy on all taxpayers as a class. In addition, if desired,
the system could be structured to furnish an additional incentive to lenders to work with
borrowers that have problems meeting their obligations and to avoid foreclosure.
The need for the alternative methods of subsidy discussed above and the size of the pool
of potential participants are questions of social policy that should properly be addressed by
the legislatures. These bodies should be fully aware that in considering whether to set a
maximum rate on interest and in determining the point at which the rate is set, the key
underlying issue is whether to subsidize borrowers that cannot obtain credit at normal market
rates. For a general discussion of the social allocation of capital, see J. VAN HORNE, supra note
62, at 217-41.
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tive, the ceiling causes considerable interruption of the credit mar-
ket, resulting in a widespread impact on the overall economy of the
state.
This Note suggests that the proposal outlined above would
solve the majority of the problems created by the present statutory
form. The proposal recognizes that in order to prevent contraction
of credit supply, the market must be allowed to set the market cost
of credit to provide lenders with an incentive to lend. Within this
framework, the best protection for the high risk borrower is for the
system to insure legitimate lenders who are competing for his busi-
ness. This competition would provide lawful sources of credit to
these borrowers while minimizing the costs to them. At the same
time, the proposal recognizes the social objective of establishing
boundaries of reasonableness to the rates of return set by the mar-
ket. The proposal emphasizes the importance of drawing the legisla-
tive classification narrowly because of the restraint imposed on free-
dom of choice. It is suggested that the proposal is equally appropri-
ate for states with extensive special credit regulation as for those
with little control. For those with extensive legislation, it would
provide an umbrella framework to insure consumer protection in
transactions not included in the special laws while preventing the
inflexibility and the unfair results that occur when transactions do
not fall within the special statutes."' The proposal, as outlined
above, provides consumer protection while eliminating the wide-
spread detrimental burden on the flow of credit. The legislature
should combine this standard with laws providing consumer protec-
tion from and redress for abusive lending practices. This combina-
tion would protect the unwary borrower while assuring access to
credit for most borrowers, reasonable market returns for lenders,
and freedom of choice in the credit market.
MARK BARRY RILEY
141. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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